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Abstract 
This article examines the place of film comedy in Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalysis. It 
takes as its starting point Lacan’s most extensive consideration of a single film, the 
comedy Never on Sunday (1960) directed by Jules Dassin. It places Lacan’s reading of the 
film in relation to his other interventions on cinema, which are scattered through his 
seminars, and are more numerous and heterogeneous than generally assumed. It shows 
how the analysis contributes to Lacan’s articulation of a theory of comedy in The Ethics 
of Psychoanalysis, a seminar best known for its treatment of Antigone and tragic drama. 
The article then locates this theory of comedy and reading of Never on Sunday in relation 
to key concepts of The Ethics such as jouissance and the moral good(s). It finishes by 
proposing a general model of Lacanian reading as ‘cut’ rather than interpretation. 
 
 
Lacan, Cinema 
From Christian Metz to Screen, from Mulvey to Žižek, Lacanian psychoanalysis 
has shaped one powerful current of contemporary film theory. But unlike Gilles 
Deleuze, the source of a more recent and equally powerful current, Jacques Lacan 
did not prepare the path in advance. (Deleuze 1986 & 1989) Instead, the 
trajectory from Lacan’s thought to cinema has been indirect, and his own explicit 
contributions to this field were minimal. As Stephen Heath observes after 
outlining a few of Lacan’s scattered allusions to cinema: “all that does not 
amount to very much.” (Heath 1999, 25-6)1 Another scholar, counting 
optimistically, puts at twenty the number of references to specific films in 
Lacan’s published writings and seminars. (Motta 2013)2 In a predominantly 
abstract discourse, Lacan infrequently gave concrete examples from the clinic or 
everyday life, in marked contrast to Freud, to whom he was staging a return. 
Lacan’s interventions on cinema are rarer still, and stand out even more as a 
result. Put together they do not amount to a theory of cinema, nor are they 
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notably attentive to cinematic form. They might be better described as a series of 
forays, brief skirmishes in the cultural field, a field that is wider and more 
heterogeneous, and contains more curiosities, than might be expected. 
 
The vast majority of these references are spoken – found in Lacan’s transcribed 
seminars – and many of them are fleeting, made almost in passing, which may 
partly explain why they have attracted little notice.3 So, in a paper on 
criminology and psychoanalysis, Lacan notes that Chaplin’s Monsieur Verdoux 
(1947) seems “plausible” (vraisemblable) as a pathological case (Lacan 2007a, 
119), and in his seminar on ethics he invokes the title of Georges Franju’s La tête 
contre les murs (1959) in relation to encounters with the “moral law.” (Lacan 
1992, 70) In his seminar on the transference he remarks on the “erotics of the 
laundress” in Visconti’s Rocco and his brothers (1960), and in the same seminar, 
in a commentary on the ugliness or beauty of the analyst, he refers his audience 
to Psycho (1960) and Suddenly, Last Summer (1959), pointing out how important 
it is that Montgomery Clift should be a “beau garçon” to fulfill his narrative 
function in the transferential framework. (Lacan 2001, 456 & 23) 
 
Closer to the spirit of Žižek than Screen theory, these allusions are often droll or 
humorous. In his failed efforts to get his audience to learn German so that they 
can read Kant in the original, Lacan in his ninth seminar, Identification, compares 
himself to the characters in Un chien andalou (1929) who pull at the end of a 
rope a piano, on top of which lie two dead donkeys.4 In another invocation of 
Buñuel, he compares a photograph of Freud and his disciples to the travesty of 
the Last Supper “photographed” by the “little apparatus” at the end of Viridiana, 
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observing that Freud is more like Viridiana than Christ. (Lacan 1973, 178-9) The 
lesson of Alain Resnais’ Hiroshima mon amour (1959), Lacan explains in his tenth 
seminar, Anxiety, is to “show us very well how any old irreplaceable German can 
immediately find a perfectly valid substitute in the first Japanese man she comes 
across.” (Lacan 2014, 335)5 
 
In other places, films take on for Lacan an exemplary function, allowing him to 
lay out quick illustrations for his seminar audience.  For example, in his sixth 
seminar he seizes on a scene in Jean Renoir’s La Règle du jeu (1939) when the 
Marquis, collector of mechanical music-boxes, unveils his crowning find to a 
gathered audience. The passion of the collector for his collection, as well as the 
shame he feels at making it public, captures for Lacan the ambiguity of the 
subject’s relation to his object of desire. (Lacan 2013, 109) And the final scene of 
Fellini’s La dolce vita (1960), in which the revelers encounter on the beach in a 
net a monstrous sea creature, proves of use to him on two separate occasions. 
The first time, in his seventh seminar, he indicates that his audience knows the 
film and took great pleasure in it, and that they will be tempted, he does not say 
if correctly, to see in the creature a representative of the Lacanian “Thing”. 
(Lacan 1992, 253) The second time, in his tenth seminar, he comments on the 
dead blind eyes of the sea creature, and the way that its gaze may not see us, but 
“regards” us nonetheless, in an analysis that anticipates the much-repeated 
anecdote of the sardine tin that Lacan relates in his seminar the following year. 
(Lacan 2014, 253-4)6 Other instances include Lacan’s comparison of the 
“paradoxical space” of combat in Rashomon (Akira Kurosawa, 1950) to the space 
of sexual display, and some brief comments on the relation between 
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psychoanalyst and mathematician in the Robert Musil source-novel for Young 
Törless (Volker Schlöndorff, 1966), a film that he deems “joli,” but “un peu raté” 
(nice, but a bit of a failure).7 
In the later years of his seminar, Lacan draws less frequently on cinema. In 1969 
he claims to have walked in late to a screening of If… (Lindsay Anderson, 1968), 
and in 1976 he reports on a trip with his inner circle to a private showing of In 
the Realm of the Senses (Nagisa Oshima, 1976). His late entry to If… might explain 
why he mistakes the film’s public school setting for the “English University” 
displayed in its “most seductive forms”.8 Even though he finds the film 
“detestable,” it is a pretext for him to re-introduce his neologism, the hommelle, 
perfectly embodied, according to Lacan, by the headmaster’s wife, who 
simultaneously occupies the position of master and knowledge (S1 and S2 in 
Lacan’s algebra). In his excoriation of the University, as incongruously 
represented by an English public school, Lacan rehearses what in the following 
year’s seminar, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, will become the University 
Discourse. Commenting directly on the events of May 1968, Lacan argues 
provocatively that students have no revolutionary potential and that they will 
continue to occupy what is a structurally “servile” position, unless they call into 
question their relation as subjects to knowledge. In his contemptuous dismissal 
of the University he also takes the opportunity to air a dispute with his hosts at 
that time, the École Pratique des Hautes Études. (Lacan 2006, 398-99)9 As for the 
erotic Japanese film, Lacan reflects on the fantasy of murdering the lover and 
removing his penis, and wonders why this is done after he is dead, and not 
before. (Lacan 2005, 126-27) 
 5 
It is a question for Lacan’s biographers why so many of the films he cites are 
from 1959 and 1960 (including La Règle du jeu, restored and rescreened in 
1959), or why the filmic examples in his seminar are so concentrated between 
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (1959-60), and Anxiety (1962-63). Was the 
psychoanalyst simply going more to the movies in this period? Or was it that 
cinema in this moment demanded his attention? In spite of the reputation of 
psychoanalysis for ahistoricism, Lacan put great stock in his seminar in what he 
called the “actual,” noting that he is “always pleased to latch onto some current 
affair in our dialogue” (m’accrocher à quelque actualité). (Lacan 2014, 29) From 
this perspective, Lacanian psychoanalytic work is not about unearthing universal 
structures, but about attentiveness to the contingencies of the signifier as 
manifested in the speech of subjects, each of whom is singular. Given Lacan’s 
attentiveness to intellectual trends, his more frequent citations of cinema in the 
years 1959-1963 may mark the actuality of the French New Wave, whose 
inaugural films date from the same years – 1959 and 1960 – as the bulk of 
Lacan’s film references. It could certainly be argued that the New Wave was 
addressing in filmic terms some of the same topics – desire, the subject, the 
absence of a sexual relation – that occupied Lacan in his teaching and clinic, and 
with the same passion for formal difficulty that Lacan displayed in his writing 
and seminar. That his only direct references to this French cinema were the 
witty remark about Hiroshima mon amour and a brief mention of Louis Malle’s 
documentary Calcutta (1969), does not mean that it was not in his mind when he 
spoke of Fellini, Visconti and Kurosawa: Lacan was also typically oblique when 
he sparred by proxy with Derrida, Deleuze, and others who were “dans le vent” 
of Parisian fashion.10 
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None of this background quite accounts for Lacan’s most sustained engagement 
with a single film. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis contains not only Franju and 
Fellini, and a meditation on the face of Harpo Marx, but also an extended 
reflection on Jules Dassin’s Never on Sunday (1960), a light comedy set in the 
Greek port of Piraeus.11 Never on Sunday competed for the Palme d’Or at Cannes 
in 1960 with L’avventura and La Dolce Vita, and enjoys a cult status in Greece and 
in the Greek diaspora, even if it did not join the two Italian films in the canon of 
European art cinema. It remains in distribution thanks to its star (Melina 
Mercouri, winner of Best Actress at Cannes, and a major figure in Greek political 
and cultural life), its soundtrack and title song (by Manos Hadjidakis, winner of 
the Academy Award for Best Song) and to a lesser extent its black-listed and 
exiled American director. Vassiliki Tsitsopoulou has convincingly argued that the 
music and dance sequences are frequent and significant enough for the film to be 
a sort of variant on the Hollywood musical comedy. (Tsitsopoulou  2000, 83) 
 
In the film Dassin himself plays Homer Thrace, a Hellenophile American who 
arrives in Piraeus seeking to discover the reason for the decline of Greece from 
its classical heights. Mercouri is Illya, an independent-minded prostitute in the 
port whom Homer takes to represent the decadence, but also the vitality of 
modern Greece. He aims to redeem her, and succeeds temporarily in doing so on 
his terms, but in the end admits defeat to Illya’s hedonism. At the film’s 
conclusion, Illya is rescued by love in the shape of the half-Italian Tonio, one of 
her regular clients. Dassin, who was also scriptwriter, claimed that he “was 
trying to criticize in comedy this awful tendency that Americans have to try to 
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remake the world in their image, in their thinking, in their imposition of what we 
call the American way of life. Often half-baked, often without any real 
understanding of what different countries are about.” (Gow 1970, 68) Never on 
Sunday was a significant box-office success, and with its idealised depiction of 
pleasure-loving Greeks “is credited with pushing the tourist boom in the early 
1960s, and establishing Greece as a favourite holiday destination.” (Iordanova 
2001, 58-9)12 
 
Even though Lacan shared with Dassin an antipathy for the “American way of 
life,” Never on Sunday seems an unlikely candidate for Lacanian analysis, and it is 
something of a puzzle why he should pause on it for so long. The rest of this 
article is devoted to this puzzle. How does Lacan’s analysis of Never on Sunday fit 
within the larger concerns of The Ethics of Psychoanalysis? What bearing do 
Lacan’s lapidary remarks on comedy in the same session have on his reading of 
the film? How do the film’s debates on happiness relate to the question of 
jouissance, and does Lacan’s intervention tell us anything more generally about 
the psychoanalytic, and more specifically Lacanian, use of cinema and comedy? 
 
Comedy, jouissance 
Lacan’s discussion of Never on Sunday comes in the final session of The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis, held on 6 July 1960 at the Hôpital Sainte-Anne in Paris, where he 
held all his seminars up until the end of 1963. His remarks are dilatory enough to 
make them his most extensive on any film, but still short enough to be 
reproduced in their entirety here: 
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Some of you recently saw a film that didn’t exactly excite me, but since then 
I have revised my impression, for there are some interesting details. It’s 
Jules Dassin’s film, Never on Sunday. The character who is presented to us 
as marvelously at one with the immediacy of his supposedly primitive 
feelings, in a small bar in Piraeus, starts to beat up (se met à casser la 
gueule) those sitting around because they haven’t been speaking properly, 
that is to say in conformity with moral norms. On other occasions, in order 
to express his immense excitement and happiness (satisfaction), he picks 
up a glass and shatters it on the ground. And every time a glass is shattered, 
we see the cash register vibrate frenetically. I see that as a beautiful touch, 
a stroke of genius. That cash register defines very clearly the structure that 
concerns us. 
 The reason why there is human desire, that the field can exist, depends on 
the assumption that everything real that happens may be accounted for 
somewhere. Kant managed to reduce the essence of the moral field to 
something pure; nevertheless, there remains at its center the need for a 
space where accounts are kept. It is this that is signified by the horizon 
represented by his immortality of the soul. As if we hadn’t been plagued 
enough (assez emmerdés) by desire on earth, part of eternity is to be given 
over to keeping accounts. In these fantasms one finds projected nothing but 
the structural relationship that I attempted to indicate on the graph with 
the line of the signifier. It is insofar as the subject is situated and is 
constituted with relation to the signifier that the break, splitting or 
ambivalence is produced in him at the point where the tension of desire is 
located. 
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 The film I just referred to, in which I learned afterwards the director, 
Dassin, plays the role of the American, presents us with a nice and curious 
model of something that can be expressed as follows from a structural 
point of view. The character who plays the satirical role, the role that is 
offered for our derision (proposé à la dérision), namely, Dassin as the 
American, finds himself to be as the producer and creator of the film in a 
position that is more American than those whom he makes fun of (livre à la 
dérision), that is, the Americans. 
 Don’t misunderstand me. He is there in order to undertake the 
reeducation of a good-hearted whore (aimable fille publique). And the irony 
of the screenwriter is to be found in the fact that in carrying out this pious 
mission he is in the pay of the one whom we might call the Grand Master of 
the brothel. The deeper meaning is signaled to us by the placing before our 
eyes of an enormous pair of black glasses – he is someone whose face is for 
good reason never shown. Naturally, when the whore learns that it is the 
character who is her sworn enemy who is paying the piper (paie les frais de 
la fête), she eviscerates the beautiful soul of the American in question, and 
he who has conceived such great hopes is made to look very foolish. 
 If there is a dimension of social criticism in this symbolism – that is to say 
that what one finds hidden behind the brothel are the forces of order, so to 
speak – it is somewhat naïve to make us hope at the end of the screenplay 
that all that is needed to solve the problem of the relations between virtue 
and desire is to close down the brothel. There runs constantly throughout 
the film that old fin de siècle ambiguity, which involves identifying classical 
antiquity with the sphere of liberated desire. It is not to have gone beyond 
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Pierre Louÿs to believe that it is somewhere outside her own situation that 
the good Athenian prostitute can focus all the light (feu) of the mirages she 
is at the center of. In a word, Dassin didn’t have to confuse what flows from 
the sight of this attractive figure with a return to Aristotelian morality, 
which he fortunately doesn’t spell out in detail. 
 Let’s get back on track. This shows us that on the far edge of guilt, insofar 
as it occupies the field of desire, there are the bonds of a permanent 
bookkeeping, and this is so independently of any particular articulation 
given of it. (Lacan 1992, 318-19; Lacan 1986, 365-67) 
 
Lacan is rarely quoted at length, and sometimes hardly at all, even by some 
Lacanians (Žižek is a case in point). This may be because once one starts citing, it 
is difficult to know where one should end. Or it may be that Lacan’s short and 
repeated formulae (“desire is the desire of the other,” “there is no sexual 
relation,” “the unconscious is structured like a language,” and so on) are 
preferred by those who cite, because in longer quotations, clarity, if anything, 
retreats further beyond the horizon. This is in some respects the case with 
Lacan’s commentary on Never on Sunday. He changes tack more than once and 
does not appear to have a single thesis. He also makes factual errors about the 
film. In the opening paragraph Lacan conflates two scenes and two characters: 
one at the beginning in which Jorgo, a local from Piraeus, dances and smashes 
glasses, and one at the end where Homer does the same. Nor is it clear whether 
the character who is “marvelously at one with the immediacy of his supposedly 
primitive feelings” is Homer or Jorgo. Later on, Lacan recognizes the film’s satire 
and critique of Americans, but does not seem to be aware that Dassin is actually 
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American, and not just playing one. At the same time, on what seems to have 
been a single viewing, Lacan is attentive to the specifically filmic effects of 
montage (the glasses and cash register) and mise-en-scène (the sunglasses of the 
villain). The key to his reading, what holds it together, is his interest in the 
tension in the film between “the sphere of liberated desire” and the question of 
“keeping accounts” in matters of morality. Put another way, the status of 
enjoyment, or jouissance, in relation to guilt. 
 
It is not immediately evident what relation Lacan’s observations about Never on 
Sunday have to the rest of the Ethics of Psychoanalysis, nor for that matter what 
bearing they have on session in which he includes them. These observations 
come more or less in the middle of the session, preceded by a discussion of 
Kantian ethics and followed by some remarks on the “service of goods” and the 
way that state power insists on desire postponing its demands. Neither of these 
subjects is addressed directly in the commentary on Dassin’s film, although 
Lacan does hint, in a tangent within a tangent, that one of its scenes illustrates 
Kant’s position that in matters of morality there is always the need “for a space 
where accounts can be kept (la comptabilisation)”. This also explains Lacan’s 
characterization of Homer as a “beautiful soul”: Hegel’s term for someone who 
holds lofty ideals without needing to pay the price for those ideals, who is 
complicit, and yet who protests “Isn’t it awful, I’m going to have nothing to do 
with it.” The only framing Lacan provides before introducing the film is to note 
that “Some of you recently saw a film that didn’t exactly excite me” (je n’ai pas été 
complètement enchanté), and when he finishes he says, “Let’s get back on track” 
(Revenons à notre voie), confirming that this has been a detour. None of this is in 
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itself unusual in Lacan’s discourse, which frequently changes directions 
unannounced, and is thick with detours. 
 
Looking beyond the immediate context of Lacan’s intervention on the film, there 
is at least one hint that might have prepared us for it. In an early part of the 
session, and before the section on Kant, Lacan takes some time to talk about 
comedy. He notes that during the year he “had recourse to tragedy” (pris le 
support de la tragédie) to make his audience understand the relation between 
action and desire in ethics, but that he could equally have drawn on “la 
dimension comique” to make his point. (Lacan 1992, 313; Lacan 1986, 361) In 
comedy as in tragedy, Lacan says, it is a question of the “fundamental failure” 
(échec fondamental) of action to catch up with desire. (Lacan 1992, 313; Lacan 
1986, 362) Lacan’s discourse proceeds in a looping and leaping fashion, so he 
does not go straight from his general thoughts on comedy to his discussion of a 
comic film, but working backwards we can see how he has laid the ground for 
that discussion, even if, when he gets to Never on Sunday, he does not mention 
that the film is a comedy, and does not refer back to what he has previously said 
about comedy. 
 
Tragedy, as Lacan says, is central to The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: in it, he devotes 
three entire sessions to Sophocles’ Antigone, making it the exemplary text for the 
year, just as he had done with Hamlet in the previous year’s seminar, Le désir et 
son interprétation. In contrast, he rarely pauses in his writings and seminars to 
draw in detail the contours of what he frequently alludes to as “the comic 
dimension”. His comments on comedy in the final session of the Ethics may be 
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only fragments, then, but in the absence of any comic equivalent of Hamlet or 
Antigone in his thinking, these fragments constitute one of his most important 
contributions to the theory of comedy, sitting alongside his reading of Freud’s 
Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious in Séminaire 5: Les formations de 
l’inconscient, and his brief commentaries on Aristophanes, Molière and Genet in 
that same seminar. According to Lacan, Molière’s L’École des femmes 
demonstrates that the most vital sources of comedy are in love, and that love is 
most “authentically” love when it is comic. (Lacan 1998, 137-9) Genet’s Le 
balcon, meanwhile, he takes to be one of the ‘chefs d’oeuvre’ of comedy, even 
though at that point it was yet to be staged (Lacan 1998, 262). He uses the play 
as a platform to make a number of statements about the genre, not all of them 
consistent with each other, including that comedy generally turns on the 
“apparition of the phallus” (262); and that it is the “law of comedy” that 
characters “enjoy (jouir de) their functions” (as bishop, general, or judge in the 
case of Le balcon) (263). 
 
To return to the key passages in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: if tragedy is the 
“triumph of being-for-death,” the temptation, says Lacan, is to see comedy as the 
triumph of life. This is a fairly common perspective in comic theory, and one that 
Lacan modifies immediately. It is not the triumph of life in comedy, but the 
triumph of a “futile or derisory (dérisoire) play of vision”. (Lacan 1992, 313; 
Lacan 1986, 362) “Dérisoire” is a favored word in Lacan’s lexicon, combining as 
it does the sense of something paltry that is at the same time ridiculous. It 
captures neatly the meager satisfactions of phallic jouissance, and indeed, it is to 
the phallus that Lacan then turns, pointing out its presence on stage in Greek Old 
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Comedy, and noting that it is still there in later comedy, as a disguised or hidden 
signifier. What satisfies us in comedy, Lacan goes on, is not the triumph of life, 
but its flight or escape (son échappée), the way that it slips past all the barriers 
that oppose it, barriers that are “constituted by the agency of the signifier”. The 
phallus is the “signifier of this flight”. (Lacan 1992, 314) It is not so much that life 
triumphs, then, but that in comedy it survives: as Lacan says, “If the comic hero 
trips up and lands in the soup, the little fellow nevertheless survives.” (Quand le 
héros comique trébuche, tombe dans la mélasse, eh bien, quand même, petit 
bonhomme vit encore.) (Lacan 1992, 314; Lacan 1986, 362) Translator Dennis 
Porter substitutes soup for molasses, and prefers “trips up” for the “stumble” 
that Lacan himself gives as translation of trébuche in Seminar 10.13 What Porter 
retains is the insight that the comic hero who stumbles is not necessarily 
identical to the “petit bonhomme” who lives on, in the split that constitutes 
comic character. Lacan had already articulated this idea in Seminar 5, where he 
said that it is “the principle of comedy” to “center attention on an ‘it’ that believes 
entirely in its own metonymic object [….] and it is also a characteristic of comedy 
that the ‘it’ of the comic subject, whatever it may be, always emerges intact.” 
(Lacan 1998, 136, my translation) 
 
In “Creative Writers and Daydreaming,” Freud claims that popular adventure 
tales usually come down to a fantasy of the “invulnerability” of the ego, with a 
hero who is “under the protection of a special Providence”: 
 
If, at the end of one chapter of my story, I leave the hero unconscious and 
bleeding from severe wounds, I am sure to find him at the beginning of the 
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next being carefully nursed and on the way to recovery; and if the first 
volume closes with the ship he is in going down at sea, I am certain at the 
beginning of the second volume to read of his miraculous rescue. (Freud 
1985, 137) 
 
In contrast, in comedy, Lacan argues, the ego is regularly destroyed, but not life 
with it, because something else survives the ego’s destruction, thrives even. That 
something else is a form of satisfaction that is highly paradoxical, since it extracts 
enjoyment from the pain of a stumble, or from the stickiness of molasses. And 
this is not just the feeling of superiority the audience is supposed to enjoy 
according to one significant strand of comic theory (Aristotle, Hobbes). The 
divide between enjoyment on the one hand and suffering on the other is not so 
easily parceled out in comedy. As Alenka Zupančič puts it, 
 
The discrepancies between what I want and what I enjoy are the bread and 
butter of comedies. So is the fact that something in me can be satisfied even 
though “I” find no satisfaction …. there is something about satisfaction and 
enjoyment that has its own logic and relatively independent autonomous 
life, which can land the subject in rather awkward situations. (Zupančič 
2008, 63) 
 
For Zupančič, the typical comic character combines a miserable “I” and a happy 
“it”. (Zupančič 2008 71) The stakes in this matter are very high for Lacan, since it 
is at this very point that he asks the question that is so often taken to be the most 
important one in his Ethics: “Avez-vous agi conformément au désir qui vous 
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habite?” (Lacan 1986, 362) Have you acted in conformity with the desire that 
inhabits you? The intractable question that follows from this is how can “I” 
conform with a desire, the fulfillment of which would bring the “I” no 
satisfaction? But then Lacan does not claim to be making recommendations for 
conduct in this final session, but offering some “propositions” that he will 
“formulate … as paradoxes.” (Lacan 1992, 319) 
 
Lacan enlists both tragedy and comedy in his argument with traditional ethics, 
whose major representatives in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis are Aristotle, Kant 
and the utilitarianism of Bentham. Far apart as they might be historically and 
philosophically, these ethical traditions, from Lacan’s perspective, all fail to take 
into account the whole field of perverse desire, a field which psychoanalytic 
experience cannot discount, since it presents itself so insistently in analysands’ 
actions and speech. Lacan, as we have already seen, agrees with the philosophers 
that how one is to act is the central question of ethics. However, he will not 
proceed on the same basis as Aristotle, for whom “a whole register of desire is 
literally situated…outside of the field of morality.” (Lacan 1992, 5) According to 
Aristotelian ethics, desire and the “good” should coincide with each other. It is 
simply a question of determining what the good is, and desire will rationally and 
reasonably follow. And why wouldn’t it? In this model the good action should be 
unambiguously pleasurable. But psychoanalysis tells another story. It discovers, 
as Véronique Voruz puts it, 
 
that there exists a form of satisfaction which goes against the grain of the 
subject’s good, perceived in the classical sense of well-being, self-
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preservation; that the appeal of “perversions”
 
may be more potent than 
“normal genital” love; and that people are undeniably far more attached to 
such a satisfaction than to pleasure. (Voruz 2009, 261-2) 
 
And as Marc de Kesel points out in his commentary on The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis, the patient may come to analysis demanding to “feel good,” but  
 
psychoanalysis cannot give any positive advice concerning that good. It can 
only assist the patient in the search for his desire as such, that is, his desire 
insofar as it does not coincide with the good(s) moral values and norms 
promise. (de Kesel 2009, 55) 
 
What Freud discovered in Beyond the Pleasure Principle and named repetition 
compulsion, and Lacan renamed jouissance, confounds Aristotle’s ethics with 
actions that refuse to line up with the “good” of the one who carries them out. 
 
Tragedy also tells another story. Antigone’s “good,” when she acts in absolute, 
indeed, inflexible conformity with her desire, brings with it anguish, turmoil, and 
ultimately death. Lacan makes the point even more forcefully in relation to 
Oedipus at Colonus, in which, even at the end, Oedipus “has none of that profound 
peace of the gods, of that transfiguration associated with the penitent that 
traditional exegesis is pleased to observe in him.” (Lacan 1992, 285) As for Kant, 
Lacan notes his “innocence” in such matters, citing an example given by the later 
philosopher: a man who has the opportunity to “spend time with the lady whom 
he desires unlawfully,” but who knows full well that the punishment for doing so 
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is the scaffold. In such circumstances, Kant believes that “every man of good 
sense will say no,” as Lacan puts it. (Lacan 1992, 188-89) For Lacan, this example 
simply shows Kant’s naivety, since psychoanalytic experience provides many 
examples of subjects steadfastly pursuing desires in the face of the pain and 
suffering that accompany acting on them, and many who say yes to both ecstasy 
and the scaffold. 
 
This pleasure in suffering, this jouissance, is what Zupančič detects at work in the 
comic protagonist as well. Certainly, presented in the right style, Kant’s example 
of the man embracing forbidden desire in the shadow of the executioner could be 
a straightforwardly comic scene. To take a more recent example, we could point 
to the “deranged penguin” of Encounters at the End of the World (2007), 
anthropomorphized in director Werner Herzog’s lugubrious voice-over. Perched 
on a rock above a penguin colony, Herzog tries to detect some anguish, some 
pathos, in the flightless birds below. “Could they just go crazy because they have 
had enough of their colony?” Herzog asks a bemused arctic scientist, who admits 
that penguins can sometimes get “disoriented”. Herzog finds one such 
disoriented penguin, determinedly heading in the wrong direction, away from 
both feeding ground and colony, into an empty frozen wasteland. “Even if we 
caught him and brought him back to the colony” Herzog observes, “he would 
head immediately back towards the mountains”. The film leaves this doomed 
penguin “heading off into the interior of the vast continent with five thousand 
kilometers ahead of him … heading towards certain death”. The scene can of 
course be read sentimentally: there is nothing more pathetic than the death of an 
innocent and ignorant animal. And yet, there is also in this waddling 
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Chaplinesque figure, who spurns the goods of feeding ground (nourishment) and 
colony (neighbours, the society of others) the resilient survival of the “petit 
bonhomme”.14 Lacan’s dispute with traditional ethics is that it fails entirely to 
take account of the destructive power of the death drive and the molasses of 
jouissance. The same accusation cannot be leveled at tragedy or comedy, since 
they place these things at their very heart. 
 
Never on Sunday: three forms of enjoyment 
Against this background, there are a number of reasons why Never on Sunday 
might have appealed to Lacan in the final session of his seminar on ethics. Not 
least of these is the way it overtly stages a contest between two further models of 
happiness, or enjoyment, both of them clearly distinct from comedy’s 
paradoxical jouissance. On one side is Homer who idealizes the philosophy and 
culture of ancient Greece, and on the other is Illya, who lives and works in the 
port, laughing, uninhibited and gay. Homer, an innocent abroad, is fascinated by 
Illya, and takes her as a symbol of the decay of classical values. A self-declared 
follower of Aristotle, Homer tells Illya “You live by the Stoic and Epicurean 
philosophies that came after the fall of Greece.” He commits to reforming her, 
convinced that “A whore can’t be happy” and vows to put in her head “Reason 
instead of fantasy, morality instead of immorality”. Homer believes, as The 
Nicomachean Ethics put it, that “moral virtues… are acquired by practice and 
habituation,” and so assumes that it is just a matter of inculcating those virtues in 
Illya through an appropriate regime. (Aristotle 2004, 31) 
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At first Illya scoffs at Homer’s attempts, dismissing with especial venom all 
mention of Aristotle, because of the philosopher’s attitude towards women. 
Eventually she accepts the offer to educate her, and in a double-quick 
Pygmalionism, Homer furnishes Illya in two weeks with geometry, geography, 
history and piano-playing. A picture by Picasso replaces one of Olympiakos 
football club on her wall, and a chess set appears on her coffee table. The success 
of Homer’s project is evidenced in Illya’s newfound shame. In the first scene of 
the film she strides with abandon into the port, stripping down to her underwear 
and leaping into the water, encouraging all the men working there to follow her, 
even the most dignified. After her moral education, the scene is repeated, but this 
time Illya undresses in a makeshift cabin, emerging in bathing cap and modest 
swimsuit to daintily dip her toe in the water. She also gives up her profession, 
suddenly enlightened about its immorality. 
 
The Aristotelian’s victory is short-lived though, as Illya discovers that he has 
funded her moral education through the corrupt landlord who extorts the port’s 
other prostitutes with high rents. This character, referred to by Lacan as “the 
Grand Master of the Brothel,” is known in the film only as “Noface,” and indeed 
his face is never seen without over-sized dark glasses. Illya is the only prostitute 
in Piraeus independent of the landlord, whose henchmen she openly mocks, and 
Noface underwrites Homer’s reformation project in order to get her off the 
streets and out of the way. This is why, as Lacan notes, Homer’s “pious mission” 
is compromised from the start, dependent as it is on the very corruption he seeks 
to root out. Lacan spots and spells out Dassin’s intended message, one which the 
director felt was largely missed by audiences: “the very falseness of [Homer’s] 
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position”, the fact that “he’s tied up automatically with the character called 
Noface, who is the guy who exploits people.” (Gow 1970, 68) From this 
perspective Never on Sunday is part of the materialist’s suspicion of morality. The 
materialist insists instead on the contingency of virtue: it is not possible to be 
“good” without a specific set of economic and social conditions that allow for that 
goodness. One of the clearest articulations of this position can be found in Bertolt 
Brecht’s The Good Person of Szechwan (1943), in which the virtue of Shen Te is 
underwritten by the exploitative actions of her alter-ego Shui Ta. 
 
For reasons already outlined, Lacan, like Illya, is skeptical about the Aristotelian 
model of enjoyment, in which pleasure can be made to coincide with moral 
virtue. But he is equally skeptical about the model the film puts in opposition to 
the Aristotelian. Lacan detects in Never on Sunday a primitivist strain that 
“involves identifying classical antiquity with the sphere of liberated desire.” He 
names poet Pierre Louÿs as shorthand for a fin de siècle Hellenism that idealises 
a supposedly non-repressed sexuality, free from the constraints of modern 
morality. That Never on Sunday continues to subscribe to this ideology can be 
seen in the encounter between Illya and an English sailor, whose erectile 
dysfunction is, as one critic puts it, “a surprise for its time,” and possible only 
because the film was produced outside the constraints of the Production Code. 
(Shelley 2011, 167) Not even English psychical impotence can withstand Greek 
sensuality, though, and Illya’s sheer vitality sweeps aside such petty obstacles as 
shame and prudishness. Dassin was known to have admired Nikos Kazantzakis, 
and there is more than a little of Zorba in Illya, who embodies, in Tsitsopoulou’s 
words, “the naïve, the unreflective, the instinctive, the physical.” (Tsitsopoulou 
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2000, 90) If it is true that Never on Sunday was instrumental in the tourism boom 
in Greece, no doubt the promise of liberated desire was central to this success, 
and to the lucrative subsequent packaging on an industrial scale of Southern 
Europe to northerners suffering from sun and jouissance deficits. 
 
The key here would appear to lie in Lacan’s allusive and ambiguous admiration 
for the “beautiful touch,” the “stroke of genius” of the cash register ringing in the 
bar scenes in Never on Sunday. His point appears to be that there is no uncosted 
jouissance: with each smashed glass of libidinal expenditure, there is a price to 
pay, a running tab. While it is a little surprising to find Lacan in the position of 
the strict bookkeeper, the position becomes clearer if viewed in the light of the 
daily routine of the psychoanalytical clinic, with its usual run of neurotic 
symptoms. The neurotic, Lacan says, wants above all to avoid responsibility for 
articulating a demand, for facing up to his anxiety and desire. One neurotic 
strategy is therefore to push the responsibility for the demand onto the Other, to 
insist that the Other make demands of him: “The true object sought out by the 
neurotic is a demand that he wants to be asked of him,” Lacan says in Seminar 10, 
“He wants to be begged (Il veut que l’on supplie)”. “The only thing he doesn’t 
want,” adds Lacan, “is to pay the price.” (Lacan 2014, 51)  
 
Never on Sunday would have us believe that before Homer’s arrival Illya’s is an 
entirely non-neurotic sexuality. And yet, Illya sustains her hedonistic joie de vivre 
through an absolute obtuseness, a singular and pathological not wanting to 
know. Lacan does not mention it, but Illya shares with him a passion for classical 
tragedy, a fact that Homer seizes on as evidence that in her lies a kernel of the 
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“purity” of Greek antiquity. But Illya’s understanding of tragedy does not extend 
to accepting its pathos: against all counter indications, she asserts that Medea 
ends happily, and indeed that this is the case with all Greek tragedies. One of the 
recurring jokes in Never on Sunday is that in Illya’s retellings all tragedies end 
with the characters going together “to the seashore”. Lacan assumes that it is 
Homer, as American and Aristotelian, who is the film’s comic butt, the target of 
its derision, but Illya’s inextinguishable optimism, her “healthy” sexuality, is also 
exemplary of a certain comic jouissance, with the “I” going one way and the “it” 
another. 
 
At the start of his teaching year that ends with Never on Sunday, Lacan expresses 
his skepticism about the eighteenth-century philosophy of libertinage, which 
aimed at the “naturalist” liberation of desire, but which nevertheless, Lacan 
insists, places obligations on its adherents, like any other ethical system. 
Foremost among these was the exhausting obligation to “enjoy,” but even this 
could not dispose of feelings of culpability at the failure to do so. And so it is with 
Illya, whose defining constraint, beyond a pathological injunction to be happy, is 
found in the title of the film. Illya may be a form of libertine, untroubled by 
religious or moral scruples, but her liberated desire is circumscribed precisely by 
a negation: she is untroubled by religious belief, instead insisting each week on 
holding a party for her favorite customers. 
 
In this context, one final peculiarity of Mercouri’s character deserves mention. In 
her autobiography, Mercouri spells her character’s name “Illya,” which is the 
spelling I have adopted. The MGM Entertainment DVD version distributed in 
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2005 renders it “Illia,” while IMDB gives “Ilya,” as does Wikipedia. Tsitsopoulou 
tries “Ilia,” while Dina Iordanova in turn offers “Illyia”. It may be that the name is 
difficult to spell properly because it is not a Greek woman’s name, nor indeed a 
woman’s name. In fact, none of these five versions are recognized names at all, 
with the exception of “Ilya,” which is an Eastern European man’s name. The 
answer to this puzzle can be found in the final credits of the film, which was 
jointly produced by Melinafilm and Lopert Pictures Corporation. Melinafilm was 
formed especially for Never on Sunday, which struggled to find funding, and 
Lopert Pictures was mainly a distribution company, producing only one other 
film during its existence. By 1958 it was owned by United Artists, but still run by 
its founder, Ilya Lopert. When Dassin was pitching Never on Sunday to United 
Artist’s European head Charles Smadja, Smadja asked for the lead character’s 
name. Dassin, casting around, said Ilya, after Lopert, whose office was the next 
one down the hall. (Mercouri 1971, 117) Nothing more than a little filmmaking 
anecdote, perhaps, but the masculine name is of no little consequence: Illya is 
found almost exclusively in the company of men, in relations that are in equal 
measures fraternal and conjugal. Here, if anything, is the perverse incestuous 
core of this story of female Don Juanism, a perversity that dissolves abruptly at 
the end when Illya is “saved” by the love of Tonio rather than the education 
offered by Homer. As for Lopert Pictures, it specialized in distributing in the 
United States foreign art films whose sometimes risqué content was in danger of 
contravening the Production Code (Balio 1987, 226). 
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Cuts 
Lacan’s disparate commentary on individual films has remained largely 
unremarked upon. One reason for the lack of engagement with this small 
collection of brief interventions may be the fact that so many of Lacan’s 
references to films come in his seminars. Some seminars have only been 
published recently, others are still to be released and translated in authorized 
versions, and remain available only in unauthorized versions, most easily 
accessible online. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis was published in French in 1986 
and translated into English in 1992, so Lacan’s thoughts on Never on Sunday are 
not recent news. But the relative obscurity of Never on Sunday and its apparent 
frivolity do not provide much encouragement to Lacanian critics more at home 
with Antigone than with musical comedy. Nor does what Lacan says about the 
film fit obviously into dominant strands of Lacanian film theory preoccupied 
with apparatus, gaze, and ideology. There is also the suspicion that for Lacan 
psychoanalysis is the primary interest here, and film distantly secondary. 
 
The standard accusation leveled at psychoanalytic interpretations of aesthetic 
objects is that they find the same thing wherever they look: whatever the literary 
or filmic surface, the same psychoanalytic concepts or principles are discovered 
at work underneath. In the worst cases the charge is completely justified, in 
readings where, for example, different characters in a film are reduced to 
embodying the id, ego and superego of Freud’s second topography, or when the 
Oedipus complex is relentlessly hunted down in film after film. On the face of it, 
the accusation might be leveled at Lacan in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, where 
 26 
Never on Sunday seems little more than an opportunity to illustrate 
psychoanalytic concerns about desire and ethics. 
 
But Lacan was not exactly in the business of interpretation: neither in the clinic 
nor in the cinema. Just as in the clinic he resisted providing an explanation for 
the analysand’s symptom, so with films he does not try to close off their meaning 
once and for all. The film as discrete object is not his quarry. Instead, it is more 
the case that he plunders from one film, steps off from another. He does not try 
to comprehend the film in its entirety or unity, but extracts from it some detail, 
just as in analysis the analytic method is to break into the analysand’s discourse 
to seize on some dissonant element. When he first introduces Never on Sunday, 
he makes clear that he does not think much of the film as a whole, but he returns 
to it because he finds in it “some interesting details” (de bons détails): to be exact, 
the montage of smashed glasses and cash register. In this sense, for Lacan it is 
not a question of culture, and film as part of it, as some sort of surface that yields 
up a psychoanalytic depth, but rather culture as a sort of continuous surface, a 
Moebius strip, from which relevant details can be plucked, without regard for the 
supposed specificity of genre or medium. Or more precisely, it is a strip in which 
one can make a cut at a given point. I wrote earlier that Lacan claims to have 
walked in late to the “detestable” If…, but this is not exactly what he says. He tells 
his audience they should come in at the right moment, like he did (entrez au bon 
moment, comme j'ai fait). He refers to the old practice in cinemas of continuous 
projection of films allowing spectators to enter at any point, and leave again 
“where they came in”. He alludes as well to the way the analyst must learn when 
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to interrupt, to cut into the analysand’s speech, and in the process informs us 
that the Lacanian approach to cinema is entirely a matter of timing. 
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1 In a footnote, Heath continues: “Perhaps the most consequent of Lacan’s 
references is his little fable [in Seminar II] of a camera filming in the absence of 
any human presence to illustrate the idea of a consciousness without ego.” (51). 
2 The count is optimistic because Motta includes films such as Rififi (Jules Dassin, 
1955) where Lacan simply reproduces a phrase from the film, or notes that Él 
(Luis Buñuel, 1953) was a critical text for Lacan, but does not identify where he 
cites it. He also includes references to actors (James Dean, Brigitte Bardot, Harpo 
Marx) where no film is identified by Lacan. Motta has done a great service in 
identifying these disparate references, but his analysis is restricted to providing 
brief summaries of Lacan on each film, along with unrelated background 
material on the films, and he does not draw any significant psychoanalytic 
conclusions about Lacan’s remarks on cinema.  
3 Paul Flaig notes that, “Despite the importance of Jacques Lacan’s thought for 
film theory, there is almost no scholarly engagement with the various 
discussions of film in his seminars.” (Flaig 2011, 99) 
4 Transcriptions of Lacan’s unpublished seminars are available online at various 
sites. I have used Staferla, including for Seminar IX, L’identification, cited here 
from the session of 21 February 1962. 
5 It is instructive to compare Lacan’s sardonic remarks with a Lacanian film 
theorist’s approach to the same film.  Todd McGowan soberly explains that 
Hiroshima mon amour demonstrates the “impossibility of the object” and the 
“traumatic real of the other.” (McGowan 2007, 189) 
6 Fellini appears again briefly in Seminar 17, in which Lacan quibbles on the 
spelling of Satyricon (1969). (Lacan 2007b, 81) 
7 Lacan, L’identification, session of 27 June 1962; Jacques Lacan, Seminar XIII, 
L’objet de la psychanalyse, session of 8 June 1966. 
8 In the British education system, a “public school” is in fact not a state-run 
institution, put a privately run one, more like an American prep school. 
9 This seminar was Lacan’s last at the École Pratique des Hautes Études, whose 
authorities asked him to leave at the end of the year. The following year he 
moved to the Law Faculty at the Place du Panthéon. 
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10 There is another example of the actuality of Lacan’s filmic references in 
Anxiety, the session of January 30, 1963 when Lacan alludes to Cybèle, ou Les 
dimanches de Ville-d’Avray (Serge Bourguignon, 1962), a film released in Paris in 
late November 1962, that went on to win the Oscar for Best Foreign Film.  
Apropos of a case of Margaret Little’s that he is summarizing, in which the sexual 
undercurrents in a father-daughter relation are very mildly thematized, Lacan 
remarks that “We are hardly, in this story, in dimanches de Ville-d’Avray.” (Lacan 
2004, 170, my translation). The film in question stages a chaste romance 
between a 30-year-old man and a twelve-year-old girl, taking as its pretext the 
abandonment of the girl in an orphanage by her father, with the man, Pierre, 
acting as paternal substitute, taking Cybèle out on Sundays. The “purity” of their 
relationship was much and admiringly commented on at the time in what Ginette 
Vincendeau describes as a symptomatic denial of the strong erotic dimension of 
the film. (Vincendeau 2014) Based on his laconic comment on the film, Lacan 
was not fooled by all the critical protestations about purity and “tasteful” 
handling of the theme. Nor does he pause on the Pierre/père pun the film offers 
up, although it is worth noting that it is the second film with “Dimanche” in the 
title that attracted his attention, and he never hesitated, especially in later years, 
to play on words that contained the “dit” (say) of “dire” (saying), such as “dit-
mension,” which he turned into “dit-mansion,” and of course “Dimanche” itself, 
which occasioned in Encore an extended pun on the English Channel (La 
Manche). (Lacan 1975, 96-7) 
11 For an extended meditation on Lacan’s remarks on Harpo’s face, see Flaig 
2011. 
12 In her autobiography, Mercouri, future Greek Minister for Culture, confirms 
this view of the film’s influence on tourism: “The film Never on Sunday was an 
international success. It gave me a name. It was nominated for five Oscars, but 
the deepest satisfaction was that it stimulated hundreds of thousands of people 
to visit Greece.” (Mercouri 1971, 137) The film’s title song continues to provide a 
soundtrack in many Greek holiday resorts, along with the music from Zorba the 
Greek (Michael Cacoyannis, 1964). 
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13 “My God, it might’ve taken me awhile to get to it, but what a beautiful language 
the English language is! Who here knows then that, already since the fifteenth 
century, slang has found this marvel of replacing on occasion I understand you 
perfectly by I understumble you perfectly? … This understumble, untranslatable in 
French, incorporates stumble (trébuche) into understand. Understanding always 
amounts to struggling forward into misunderstanding.” (Lacan 2014, 79) 
14 Thanks to Daniela Caselli for reminding me of this scene. 
